ARE NEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH PARAMILITANTS AND DRUG-TRAFFICKERS POSSIBLE?

 “Some are born stupid, other achieve stupidity and others have stupidity thrust upon them” Paul Tabori

This Easter, the news that, once again, Urabeños and the so-called Office were looking into establishing a process of negotiation, and that local and national governments had reiterated their already well-known opposition to this possibility, passed by unnoticed as Columbia and the world mourned the death of Gabriel García Márquez.

One of the problems the country faces in significantly reducing the causes of violence, in terms of the process of negotiation with the FARC, is the existence of a changed armed group that has evolved into large criminal businesses dominated by mafia, as with paramilitarism. Increasingly involved in drug-trafficking, this armed group has become an important power in cities and rural areas, posing pertinent questions for the discussions taking place in Havana, not only in relation to illegal drugs, but generally about the wide range of fields in which these organizations make their money, both legally and illegally. One of these questions might well be: “How much will what is negotiated and turned into concrete action have an impact on removing the factors which the State, the economy, politics and culture have allowed this monstrosity into Columbian society?

Ever since the previous government, which was so intent on changing reality by ignoring the facts, declared the end to paramilitarism and dubbed the strongholds left after the spurious Ralito Pact as Bacrim, the State has been in confrontation with the agreements signed with the USA, whose precarious successes in no way compare to the resources spent, the environmental impact and above all, the permanent rate of victimization of people. In some way, this view suggests that the elite, for reasons which would be worth looking into, have still not understood the transformation – which for the armed conflict meant the end of drug-trafficking – impossible to distinguish from the modus operandi employed by all armed groups, including the State armed forces.

Every now and again, the new paramilitary leaders, who pop up like weeds, have expressed an interest in establishing a new agreement and the official response has always been a resounding “no”. Here, it is important to point out that negotiations with paramilitants – which most recently related to drug-trafficking – is nothing new. The former president, Gaviria, negotiated with them and the negotiations held by former President Uribe in Ralito were, in essence, a deal with drug-traffickers – and in some way that is why they ended up extradited – because the number of gatecrashers who at the last minute became paramilitant bosses was not small. Both attempts failed because it was reduced to the prosecution and demobilization of its most important figures and issues relating to how they grow were omitted. Quite a lot is said about the spilled blood that we could have saved if the attempt of Belisario Berancur, when he first authorized contact with Panama, had not been aborted.

At a time when anti-drugs policy is being debated, concrete decisions have already been made that are paving the way for another approach: Some deal with legalization and others take the view that this is foremost a public health problem. Many of the reasons which support the Colombian government’s coercive and punitive view derive from the global promises made by the State of Colombia to multilateral organizations, or from the moralistic approaches which frequently pop up, substantiating the absurd idea of this ineffective war. Galtung, in an interview in 2011, when the Mexican government declared war on drug-trafficking, stated that “this approach from the Mexican government of not making contact, the attitude that they (drug-traffickers) do not deserve to be accepted as part of the process, does not help at all. It is the same thing that the EU is doing with Hamas in Palestine; contact has to be made, there has to be a dialogue”. He adds that “killing the aggressors is not the solution (…) it only generates more violence and resentment”.

With this in mind, it is no exaggeration to think that Colombia has become a member of that exclusive list, masterfully compiled by Paul Tabori, of the most characteristic examples throughout history of human stupidity: A country, with one of the highest indexes of inequality and poverty is spending resources on a war which, in the end, will only result in more poverty and inequality, a long list of victims and, very likely, a society yet more insecure and immersed in fear. This perverse logic is completely devoid of any rationality or good sense.

Columbia is one of the few countries that can truly talk to the world from experience with regards to drug-trafficking and illegal activities. Unlike anyone else, we have the moral authority to do it because we have buried the dead, we have suffered the effects of corruption and we have suffered the breakdown of morality in society. There is no reason why Columbia should refuse the possibility of new perspectives on the problem, even including the possibility of negotiations with a deleterious mix of paramilitants and drug-traffickers. Therefore, while what happened in Havana is being finalized, we should take the initiative to establish a thorough debate on all this refined mafia entrepreneurship which has evolved into paramilitarism and drug-trafficking and therefore anti-drugs policy. It should be a debate that outlines an agenda for discussion which learns from the previous negotiations and proposes the following:

1. Surrender and dismantling of strongholds in cities and rural areas,
2. Decommissioning of routes, and also of the production and the commercialization of illegal drugs.
3. The truth regarding involvement with State bodies, politics and the economy.
4. The surrender of capital and property both legally and illegally acquired, for the implementation of an ambitious policy aimed at the prevention of drug addiction.
   

We are also aware of the controversy surrounding the issue, of the idea that it could be thought of as nothing more than a dream, naiveté even. But the reality is that there are not many options. Following negotiations, they will have to make decisions about the war that not only allow us to break free from the stupidity we have found ourselves in, but which will also make it possible to minimize the violence that has long been rife in rural areas and cities in Colombia. The decisions must also help us imagine with some certainty that fear will not govern our existence.

Opinion piece: José Girón Sierra

Observatorio DDHH-IPC April 2014

Versión en español: 

¿Es posible una nueva negociación con el paramilitarismo y el narcotráfico?